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The Implementation of Standards for Securities 
Markets as a Source of Competitiveness 
 
 
Silvio John Camilleri 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
 
This analysis discusses the importance of the operations of securities exchanges and securities 
markets, with particular reference to their relationship with competitiveness. Following a review of 
the current trends within the worldwide securities industry, the main principles which govern the 
coherent operations of securities markets are outlined.  The practical issues involved in the 
implementation of standards, and their relevance to smaller exchanges are also evaluated. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Securities markets are vital participants in the flows of funds from savers to productive users. 
Individual investors are increasingly considering the investment outlets offered by securities 
markets, as they seek to provide for their retirement. Corporate borrowers often opt for an 
alternative to the traditional bank finance, given that this may translate into a lower cost of funds.  
In view of this, securities markets perform vital functions in channeling funds within  the 
economy, and therefore their efficiency, integrity and development is of general economic 
importance. 
 
After discussing the reasons why the operations of securities exchanges and markets are of 
economic interest, this analysis reviews the current trends within the worldwide securities 
industry.  Following the main principles which govern the coherent operations of securities 
markets are analysed, together with the practical issues involved in the implementation of 
standards, and their relevance to smaller exchanges. 
 
2. The Objectives Of International Securities Arrangements 
 
The objectives of implementing standards concerning securities markets may be categorised as 
shown below.  One should note that these objectives are closely related to each other. 
 
2.1 The Adoption of Common High Quality Standards 
 
One main objective of adopting common benchmarks is to ensure a suitable level of stability in 
the financial systems, as parties operate according to a set of minimum standards. Within a 
globalised environment, economies and financial systems are becoming increasingly inter- 
connected, and the crisis in a weak link in the chain may impact on other economies, as instability 
spreads across different countries.  Therefore the co-operation and sharing of information between 
different regulators is intended to minimise market disruptions and to reduce systemic risk. 
 
Another concern which may be overcome through the implementation of common standards is 
competitive deregulation.  The latter is the process whereby national governments, in an attempt 
to gain market-share in the global financial markets, lower the standards of their regulatory 
system. Adequate common standards prevent organisations from trying to avoid onerous 
requirements by operating from countries where regulation is lax. 
 
2.2 Fostering a suitable environment for the Efficient Allocation of Capital 
 
If capital is to be allocated to the best available opportunities, information should be disseminated 
in order to enable investors to take the relevant decisions.  This explains why considerable 
importance is devoted to the issues of disclosure and transparency.  The latter is the degree to 
which information about trading prices and the depth of the market is published on a real-time 
basis. 
 
In addition, market practices should be designed to ensure the fair treatment of orders and a 
reliable price formation process.  This entails particular attention to the trading setup and to the 
trading rules.  These issues are closely connected to investor protection, in terms of the prevention 
of inappropriate trading practices. 
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2.3 Investor Protection 
 
Investors should be protected from unjust market practices. The latter include the favouring of 
some participants over others, insider trading, and attempts at market manipulation.  The latter may 
become more widespread in the context of an internet environment, where unfounded information 
and advice may be disseminated.  Investors may also be vulnerable to the misconduct of market 
intermediaries and the operators of exchanges, and therefore these should be duly licensed and 
supervised. 
 
Information dissemination is again relevant, given that this is a pre-condition to enable investors 
to assess the potential risks and rewards of their investments.  The system should aim at suitable 
disclosure requirements.  Theoretical studies such as Blackburn, Bose and Capasso (2005), 
conclude that information asymmetries may materialise in reduced resources available for 
investment, which may ultimately result in lower growth rates. 
 
2.4 The Link Between Standards and Competitiveness 
 
Whilst implementing standards and regulation to govern the operations of securities markets and 
exchanges may raise compliance costs, the potential benefits to be reaped may also result in lower 
borrowing costs and thus increased competitiveness.  For instance, the implementation of standards 
that reduce asymmetric information and market manipulation should decrease the systemic risk in 
the securities markets, leading to a lower required return on part of investors.  If efficient 
exchanges are successful in offering lower borrowing costs for businesses, this impacts on the 
competitiveness of business borrowers on a micro level, and consequently the competitiveness of 
the economy at a macro level. 
 
As discussed above, stock exchanges assist the process through which capital is allocated 
towards the best economic opportunities.  This is desirable from a macroeconomic point of 
view, given that when the available resources are put to the most productive uses, 
competitiveness is enhanced. 
 
The benefits to be reaped from efficiently-operating exchanges may have wider impacts on 
traditional methods of finance such as bank loans.  Borrowers may choose to disintermediate their 
financing process if they feel that the costs of bank borrowing are unjustifiably high.  The resulting 
competition between direct financing and bank finance should drive banks towards higher levels of 
efficiency, again translating into a lower cost of funds for businesses. 
 
The above ideologies are usually pursued through international agreements and standards, which 
are then enshrined in the regulatory set-up of the adopting countries. 
 
3. Current Trends In Securities Markets 
 
The international efforts directed towards achieving a reliable environment for the international 
trading of securities, should be discussed in the context of the current factors impacting on 
these markets outlined below. 
 
3.1 Technology and Competition 
 
Historically, exchanges were physical meeting places, where interested parties could buy and sell 
the products traded on the particular exchange.  Improvements in technology and market 
deregulation led firms to cross-list on several exchanges.  Gradually the “physical aspect” of the 
stock exchange became less important, and nowadays members of a particular exchange can trade 
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without being physically present on the trading floor. 
 
Technology enhanced information availability, and nowadays information about most markets is 
easily obtainable.  These aspects were coupled with an internationalisation of equity investment – 
investors entrust their funds to investment managers who do not restrict their portfolios to local 
securities.  These developments led to increased competition in between exchanges and higher 
demand for cross-border trading. 
 
Different exchanges had different responses to the above factors; however, they all laid particular 
attention to information dissemination and to the modernisation of trading floors through 
implementing electronic trading and back office systems in order to increase efficiency. 
 
 
3.2 The Regulatory functions of Securities Exchanges 
 
 
Though the regulatory responsibilities of exchanges vary in between countries, they are often 
shared between government institutions, securities commissions, and other bodies. Exchanges are 
at times entrusted with the responsibility of approving the prospectuses of issuers, and become 
involved in the surveillance of the markets practices in the interest of market integrity. When an 
exchange participates in the supervision of securities transactions, there is the advantage of having 
a supervisor which benefits from its nearness to the actual market.  Yet, the regulatory function of 
securities exchanges is being increasingly de- emphasised on the grounds that this may at times 
lead to conflicts of interest. For instance, an exchange might be lenient when approving the listing 
of corporate securities, in an effort to increase business. 
 
As referred to later on, exchanges perform their regulatory functions under the supervision of 
administrative authorities and therefore they are subject to accountability. 
 
 
3.3 Demutualization 
 
 
Another important trend lies in the governance of exchanges.  The latter were previously governed 
by market intermediaries, but gradually listed companies and investor representatives were allowed 
on to the boards of different exchanges.  Nowadays, some exchanges are choosing to restructure as 
a listed company.  This is not a simple cosmetic change given that it underlies the shift in mentality 
from serving the members of the exchange to acting proactively in the interest of the entire market 
and shareholders. 
 
The trend for stock exchanges to become for-profit enterprises is referred to as demutualization.  
Most exchanges were historically not-for-profit organisations, which were owned by their 
members.  Demutualised exchanges may become public companies listed on their own trading 
floor, while others remain as private corporations. 
 
Underlying the demutualization trend, is the ever increasing level of competition between 
exchanges and other trading systems such as internet-based ones.  This is entailing 
exchanges to hasten their decision making processes, expanding direct trading access and 
considering possible mergers with other exchanges. 
 
Thus, nowadays, we may speak of exchanges as companies which offer pricing, information, and 
liquidity services.  They operate in a competitive environment, as is the case of most other 
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business entities, and have to satisfy shareholders in terms of profitability.  This contrasts with past 
models of securities exchanges, when it was quite common for an exchange to hold a monopoly in 
its jurisdiction. 
 
It might be argued that the pursuit of profitability may lead to conflicts of interest, given that this 
might not be compatible with the regulatory functions of exchanges.  However, this is not 
necessarily the case, given that exchanges have to be concerned about quality, even when pursuing 
profitability.  In both cases, the end result should be securities markets which have the qualities of 
effectiveness, efficiency and speed, at a cheap cost.  In both cases, there is a concern for instilling 
investor confidence in the mechanisms, through transparency, investor protection and the integrity 
of intermediaries. In the absence of this, exchange business would suffer – irrespective of the 
profit objectives of the institution. 
 
One particular issue which is often discussed with respect to demutualization is whether an 
exchange whose shares may be bought and sold through its own trading mechanisms can function 
effectively as its own regulator.  One should keep in mind, that in such cases, the exchange still has 
an incentive to act fairly, because if it grants unfair concessions as regards its own shares, other 
issuers may move their listings elsewhere.  In addition, the risk to the exchange’s reputation as a 
fair market posed by some dubious behaviour, probably outweighs any possible gains. 
 
 
 
3.4 The Expansion to other Markets 
 
 
Most exchanges nowadays trade a wide variety of products which cover the securities process 
from primary through secondary markets, in addition to clearing and settlement and custody 
services. 
 
One particularly evident example of a new market which was developed by exchanges is the 
trading of derivative contracts which have quoted securities or price indices as their underlying 
instrument. These markets have particular competitive implications, given that trading in 
derivatives is often a multiple of the turnover of the underlying cash instruments.  In addition, 
derivative contracts may be created by the exchanges themselves, which is not the case with the 
cash instruments, where exchange turnover is dependent on the amount of securities which 
companies actually issue. 
 
 
3.5 The Awareness about Market Microstructure 
 
 
The relatively new area of market microstructure explains why it makes sense for regulators and 
exchanges to probe into certain aspects of securities trading.  For example, studies such as those by 
Demsetz (1968) and Tinic (1972) suggest that the costs of supplying liquidity are affected by order 
flow, which in turn depends on the adopted trading system. 
 
In addition there is a link between bid-ask spreads and private information i.e. information which 
is not known to all market participants.  Authors such as Kyle (1985) argued that market makers 
use order flow to update their beliefs about the value of securities.  Market makers estimate the 
probability of trading based on private information and adjust bid-ask spreads accordingly.  The 
higher the amount of estimated private information, the higher the bid-ask spreads.  This adds to 
trading costs, and decreases the returns from holding the stock which results in higher financing 
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costs for the issuer. 
 
Studies have also examined into the impacts of other policies such as trading halts [Lauterbach and 
Ben-Zion (1993), Lee, et. al. (1994) and Hauser et. al. (2006)] market transparency [Bloomfield 
and O’Hara (1999) and Hendershott and Jones (2005)] and the links between brokers’ operations 
and the trading process [Stoll (1978), Wahal (1997) and Chakravarty and Sarkar (2002)]. 
 
The above literature, explains why regulators are concerned with the particular trading infrastructure 
which is adopted in securities markets.  In addition, trading systems and practices must satisfy 
ultimate investors, in terms of inspiring confidence that they are obtaining a fair deal. 
 
4. The Principles Underlying Securities Markets Financial Arrangements 
 
 
IOSCO (International Organisation of Securities Commissions) is one important driver of securities 
markets standards.1 The organisation’s efforts are based on a set of principles which countries are 
encouraged to embody in their own regulatory setup.2   This section summarises these ideologies. 
 
 
4.1 Principles Relating to the Regulator 
 
 
Regulators should operate independently according to clearly stated responsibilities.  Their statute 
should provide for the sufficient powers and resources which are required to exercise these 
responsibilities.  Regulators should be operationally independent and accountable in the exercise of 
their functions and powers.  The information obtained by regulators though the course of their duties 
is confidential, although this should not preclude co-operation in between regulators, as discussed 
below.  Regulators should also be at public scrutiny. 
 
 
4.2 Principles for Self-Regulatory Organisations 
 
 
SROs should be responsible for exercising supervision, when they are delegated such functions in 
their areas of competence. SROs should in turn be supervised by the main regulator.  Aspects 
relating to confidentiality and cooperation with other regulators are relevant to SROs as well.  In 
addition, SROs should not use these responsibilities as an unfair competitive advantage versus other 
operators. 
 
4.3 Principles for Issuers 
 
Issuers of securities should comply with respective disclosure requirements, principally, by 
publishing their financial results and other facts which may have material implications in terms of 
pricing and investors’ decisions.  Disclosure requirements apply both in the advertising for public 
offerings, and subsequent to the flotation when information should be circulated on a timely and 
ongoing basis. 
  
Issues should be subject to specific and general disclosure requirements.  Specific disclosure 
requirements include obligations to state who has a significant interest in the company, those who 
seek control of the company, and other issues related to corporate governance.  Such requirements 
                                               
1
 A list of Organisations involved in the securities markets field is shown in the Appendix 
2
 “Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation”, IOSCO, February 2002 
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should be supplemented by a general disclosure requirement, which provides for the disclosure of 
any other material information. 
 
At times, it might not be in the company’s interest to promptly publish sensitive information, such 
as the proceedings of unfinished merger negotiations.  In such cases, trading in the particular 
securities should be temporarily suspended, given that such situations might favour those parties 
who possess insider information. 
 
Information published by issuers, should be accurate and reliable.  Financial results should be 
drawn up according to internationally accepted accounting standards and audited, for the 
sake of accuracy and comparability in between companies. 
 
Securities regulators should also aim at facilitating cross-border offerings and listings, and IOSCO 
recommends the implementation of the International Disclosure Standards for Cross- Border 
Offerings and Initial Listings by Foreign Issuers. 
 
Issuers should treat the holders of their securities in an equitable manner. 
 
 
 
4.4 Principles for Collective Investment Schemes 
 
 
Collective investment schemes present a convenient way through which investors may diversify 
their portfolios in the absence of having large sums of money available for investment. Regulators 
should establish requirements for the licensing, and the management of collective investment 
schemes, especially with regards to the protection and segregation of client assets.  Disclosure 
requirements should also be applicable to collective investment schemes, including the basis on 
which the prices of shares are established, the inherent risks of the scheme, the fees related to the 
investment, and under what conditions may the units be redeemed. 
 
The operators of collective investment schemes should be subject to eligibility criteria, in terms 
of their integrity, competence and financial capacity.  In addition, they should maintain 
appropriate records relating to the scheme, which are an essential tool for supervisors to 
determine whether the venture is conforming to its obligations.  The latter should include 
regulations with respect to best execution and the timely allocation of transactions. 
 
When the operators of the scheme delegate part of their responsibilities to a third party, the above 
obligations should still be fulfilled.  Collective investment schemes are also marketed across 
different countries, and therefore effective surveillance pre-supposes the cooperation of different 
supervisors. 
 
 
4.5 Principles for Market Intermediaries 
 
 
Market intermediaries should be suitably classified, usually according to whether they are 
authorised to manage individual portfolios, whether they simply execute orders, whether they deal 
exclusively in the distribution of particular securities and whether they are solely offering financial 
advice – or any combination of these. 
 
The licensing of market intermediaries should be subject to the latter satisfying pre-specified 
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minimum standards, including capital requirements.  Such requirements are established in order to 
deal with cases where poor management leads to the failure of an intermediary, failure to obtain 
appropriate settlement on behalf of a client or possible misappropriations of client money. 
 
Intermediaries should be required to protect the interests of their clients. The latter should have 
access to a suitable complaints mechanism, which should be effective in dealing with cross-border 
transactions. 
 
Regulators should assess the adequacy of the risk management processes of intermediaries, possibly 
with the help of SROs or external auditors.  Regulators should have access to information from 
intermediaries, in addition to the power to inspect their documents and possibly revoke their license. 
 
Regulators should also pre-establish the procedures for dealing with possible failures of market 
intermediaries in order to minimize the disruption to the financial system. 
 
 
4.6 Principles for the Secondary Market 
 
 
Trading systems, including securities exchanges, should be subject to the prior approval of 
regulators.  Regulators must be satisfied as regards various aspects of the trading methods, such as 
the price formation process, the rules of the system, order execution procedures, system participants, 
types of financial instruments being traded, the clearing and settlement process and governance 
arrangements.  Trading systems should be subject to ongoing surveillance in order to ensure that 
trading is executed in a fair manner.  Approval from the regulator should be required for operators 
to amend their trading system rules. 
 
Prior to allowing intermediaries to access the trading system, its operators must be satisfied of the 
integrity of the intermediary. 
 
Regulators should detect inappropriate practices occurring on the secondary market, such as 
attempts at market manipulation and insider dealing.  Again, cross-border regulatory cooperation is 
relevant here, for example in cases where the ‘cash asset’ and its’ associated derivative trade in 
different countries. 
 
Regulation should promote transparency of trading.  Information on completed transactions, and 
unsatisfied orders should be provided on the same basis to all participants. 
 
Clearing and settlement of securities transactions should also be subject to supervision, given that 
this area may have considerable implications for systematic risk.  A disruption in any of the 
institutions that assist in the clearing function, or a disruption in any of its’ main users, could result 
in liquidity problems or losses for other participants.  Clearing and settlement systems should be 
under the direct supervision of the main regulator who should establish 
that these systems function efficiently in terms of trade verification, margin and netting 
requirements. 
 
Technological improvements imply that markets are becoming increasingly automated, for example 
in the development of cross-border screen based trading systems. The latter link market participants 
across jurisdictions without the necessity for intermediation via an exchange floor, and this presents 
new economic, financial, legal and regulatory issues. 
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5. Putting Standards Into Practice 
 
 
Establishing standards and regulations may prove to be an intricate issue.  The appropriate 
regulation partly depends on the nature of the market and there are also challenges in implementing 
regulations.  Standards should gain acceptance by a wide variety of jurisdictions, which must then 
embody them in their regulation, and enforce them.  The co- operation between supervisors is a key 
determinant of the possible success in this regard. 
 
 
5.1 Cooperation 
 
 
As stated previously, players in securities markets are becoming increasingly international. For 
example, companies often seek to have their securities cross-listed on foreign exchanges and 
intermediaries may opt to operate in more than one country.  Financial conglomerates operate in a 
number of countries and are therefore subject to the supervisory oversight of a number of regulators. 
 
This emphasises the importance for regulators to establish strong collaborative relationships 
between them. Professional secrecy considerations should not hinder the forwarding of information 
between regulators as this is a necessary pre-condition in supervising cross- border transactions.  In 
this respect, supervisors should aim for effective information sharing mechanisms across 
jurisdictions.  Such arrangements should identify the circumstances when information may be 
requested, and the information which may be provided subject to confidentiality conditions. 
 
There is yet another dimension to cooperation between regulators.  This occurs when financial 
system regulators have to cooperate with other types of authorities, such as in the case of criminal 
investigations of money laundering activities. 
 
 
5.2 Implementation 
 
 
The effectiveness of international financial standards may be hampered by the fact that their 
implementation is a sovereign decision and countries usually employ such standards when it is in 
their own national interest.  In addition, a number of countries would rather adopt their own “tailor-
made” standards which they consider to be more appropriate for their economic circumstances. 
 
Countries also fear any possible adverse publicity, should they choose to adopt given standards and 
then fail to comply at a later stage.  In addition, the implementation of standards requires a 
considerable amount of resources, such as nurturing the necessary technical expertise, both in terms 
of regulators, supervisors and other market players. 
 
In this respect, cooperation is again relevant in achieving a widespread acceptance of standards 
across countries.  Ideally, a wide range of countries should be involved in establishing the 
standards, given that a country should be more willing to adopt standards if it has participated in 
their creation.  International institutions should also assist countries in the implementation process. 
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5.3 Enforcement of Securities Regulation 
 
Standards have to be embodied in the regulatory set up of particular jurisdictions. Supervisors 
should have the power to exercise their duties, and to conduct preventive surveillance programs. 
In addition, supervisors should have the power to request information and inspect the operations of 
exchanges and intermediaries.  These should be supplemented with investigation and enforcement 
programs where necessary. 
 
Regulators should also be in a position to impose administrative sanctions on market players, have 
the power to initiate or to refer matters for criminal prosecution, and require the intermediary to 
suspend trading if necessary.  Notwithstanding this, investors should still be able to seek legal 
actions against their own intermediaries. 
 
In addition, legislation and the enforcement powers of the regulator should be adequate for 
dealing with cases of cross-border misconduct, such as money laundering.  If any of the 
regulatory functions are delegated to SROs or other parties, the latter should also be subject to 
disclosure and confidentiality requirements. 
 
 
 
 
6. The Role Of Smaller Securities Exchanges 
 
 
Whilst the global securities markets are dominated by the big names, such as the New York Stock 
Exchange, Nasdaq, and the London Stock Exchange, the role of smaller stock exchanges should 
not be overlooked.  Smaller exchanges should serve as suitable means through which smaller 
companies can tap funds.  Such companies are usually well known within their region; however 
they may find the marketing campaigns and fees involved when listing on a major exchange to be 
prohibitive.  Given this, it is generally considered as advantageous for companies to list in their 
own country or region and smaller companies are not likely to list on distant exchanges unless the 
additional liquidity and access to capital make it worth the effort and cost. 
 
Another important role of smaller exchanges is the gathering and provisioning of market 
information.  Such information is nowadays required on a global basis, as fund managers 
increasingly diversify their portfolios, and seek the most attractive risk-return combinations. 
 
Exchanges are subject to direct competition on an international basis and therefore they should spot 
and take advantage of any opportunities when they come along.  These opportunities may be in the 
form of proposed mergers or agreements aimed at closer cooperation between exchanges.  In 
addition, smaller exchanges should not overlook the possibility of attracting cross-listings from 
companies which are already listed on other exchanges.  Through the use of appropriate technology 
and infrastructure, securities listed on smaller exchanges should be accessible internationally, and 
this may reduce the traditional disadvantages of remoteness from the major financial centres. 
 
In this respect, the infrastructure and systems of exchanges (especially the smaller ones), should be 
able to interact with those of others. Compatibility in between systems is becoming increasingly 
important as exchanges seek to interconnect trading systems and develop a global market structure 
based on transparency. 
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Smaller exchanges have the potential to create a niche market, through the retention of 
characteristics which are particular to a given market.  However, this should not compromise the 
adherence to internationally accepted standards and arrangements.  Indeed, it may prove to be 
advantageous to such exchanges, to adopt such standards right at their initial stages, in order to gain 
credibility. 
 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
 
This study has reviewed the objectives and principles of international arrangements relating to 
securities  activities, and the practical issues involved in implementing them within the context 
of the current trends affecting this arena. 
 
As a concluding note, it may be pertinent to say that there is no one single ‘correct’ approach 
towards the implementation of the concepts discussed throughout this study.  The particular manner 
in which countries choose to approach these standards partly depends on their domestic context. 
 
Implementation should not overlook the fact that securities market standards relate to appropriate 
legal, accounting and fiscal frameworks.  In addition, adequate requirements can no longer be 
applied independently of the trends in other major systems – the effective supervision and 
enforcement of securities markets often require suitable interaction between regulators, both at the 
domestic and international levels. 
 
The re-regulation of securities activities should be an ongoing process, as markets develop and 
innovate through new products and methods of operation.  International financial standards for 
securities markets should not be viewed as a burden.  The regulatory set up should not impose 
excessive obligations on the market or hinder growth or financial innovation within the economy 
through excessive requirements which inhibit justified risk taking.  On the contrary, standards 
should be aimed at fostering efficiency in the financial system, in order to serve as a competitive 
edge within the real economy.  In addition, they should serve as a means through which jurisdictions 
may gain international acceptance and credibility. 
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APPENDIX – SECURITIES MARKETS ORGANISATIONS 
 
The establishing and implementation of arrangements and standards with respect to 
securities markets is driven by various international and regional organisations, including 
the ones shown below. 
 
IOSCO (International Organisation of Securities Commissions) 
 
IOSCO is the leading international group of securities market regulators. Its members 
include various regulatory bodies originating from different countries.  The main objective 
of this organisation is to foster a high degree of interaction and cooperation between 
regulators, at the domestic and at the international level. This entails the exchange of 
information between regulators, the establishment of standards and an effective 
surveillance of international securities transactions. 
 
IOSCO has published a range of reports and its members have adopted a number of 
resolutions, which constitute an important source of information on the principles that 
underlie effective securities regulation. 
 
WFE (World Federation of Exchanges) 
 
The World Federation of Exchanges has members from worldwide exchanges, settlement 
institutions and clearing houses. WFE is concerned with the discussion of issues which 
impact on the efficiency and integrity of securities markets and it establishes standards to 
be followed by the industry. WFE also provides assistance as regards business strategies 
and management policies, especially to newly set up and smaller exchanges.  Membership 
of WFE is only possible after an operator has assumed commitment to prescribed 
standards. 
 
BIS (Bank for International Settlements) 
 
While the primary functions of BIS are not exclusively related to securities markets, this 
institution often works in this area, for instance in the establishment of Recommendations 
for Securities Settlement Systems.  The BIS’s Committee on Payment and Settlement 
Systems (CPSS) monitors developments in 
domestic payment, settlement and clearing systems as well as in cross-border and 
multicurrency settlement schemes. 
 
The Committee on the Global Financial System is concerned with the examination of broad 
issues relating to financial markets and systems, with particular reference to the analysis of 
threats to the stability in the global financial system. This Committee is particularly 
concerned with increasing the transparency of financial markets. 
 
 
SEC (Securities Exchange Commission) 
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The primary motive of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is to protect 
investors and maintain the integrity of securities markets. SEC is particularly concerned 
that all investors have access to basic information, and it therefore requires public 
companies to comply with disclosure requirements. 
 
The SEC also supervises the main participants in the U.S. securities markets, including 
stock exchanges, brokers, investment advisors and collective investment schemes. It is 
involved in enforcement actions against individuals and companies that breach securities 
laws, such as in cases of insider trading, accounting fraud, and providing false or 
misleading information. 
 
CESR (Committee of European Securities Regulators) 
 
CESR represents European national securities authorities and aims at improving 
coordination among these bodies.  It also acts as an advisory body to assist the European 
Commission in the regulation of Europe’s securities markets. In order to promote common 
and uniform implementation of EU securities law, CESR may issue guidelines, 
recommendations and standards. 
 
FESE (Federation of European Stock Exchanges) 
 
FESE represents the collective interests of European exchanges, through focussing on the 
main European Union institutions (Commission, Parliament, Council) and CESR. FESE is 
a trade association with a main interest in legislative and regulatory issues for financial and 
capital markets at the level of the European Union. 
 
ICMA (International Capital Market Association) 
 
Formerly known as International Securities Market Association, ICMA is a self-regulatory 
organisation and a trade association for international securities markets. ICMA currently 
has members from over 40 countries. Its main aims include the analysis of the fast-
changing marketplace through the issuing of rules and recommendations relating to trading 
and settlement practices. The Association’s bye-laws provide for disciplinary proceedings 
and procedures for the settlement of disputes through conciliation and arbitration. 
 
Self Regulatory Organisations 
 
Regulatory regimes of securities markets may involve Self-Regulatory Organizations 
(SROs) which may constitute an important complement to the main regulator in achieving 
stated objectives. These bodies have first hand knowledge of the market, which proves 
invaluable in implementing certain safeguards, such as those dealing with insider trading.  
Market players are also more likely to follow rules that they have participated in 
developing.  In addition SROs may be successful in implementing higher ethical standards 
which go beyond those of the main regulator. 
 
Exchanges themselves may often be classified as SROs. For example, they are often 
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entrusted with the surveillance of market intermediaries and with ensuring that listed 
companies adhere to governance and disclosure standards. SROs should be overseen by 
the main regulator, who should ensure that they observe standards of fairness and 
confidentiality when exercising delegated powers and responsibilities. 
 
The main regulator should monitor and address any potential for conflicts of interest that 
may arise on part of SROs. For example, when entrusting one particular exchange with 
self-regulation, the SRO may utilise the fees paid by market participants in order to 
subsidize its own commercial operations. The regulatory obligations delegated to a 
particular operator, should not translate into a competitive advantage over its peers.  One 
potential solution to such a problem may lie in establishing a Committee to whom issues 
should be referred in case of conflicts of interest.  Such Committee might also include 
representatives of the exchange itself. In addition, regulators should also oversee those 
exchanges which are involved in enforcing regulation, in order to confirm that they are 
doing so in a coherent manner. 
 
 
 
